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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Army has undergone unprecedented change in the last decade, completing an 
organizational transformation and redesigning its deployment policies.  These changes 
and other factors have resulted in an increase of 107% in equipping requirements 
between 2003 and 2011, forcing the Army to update its equipping policies. We develop 
the “multi-period optimal readiness allocation model” (MPORAM) to maximize unit 
equipment readiness across the force over several years.  MPORAM extends an earlier 
single-period model to account for the dynamic nature of unit priorities, budget, and other 
factors that vary over the planning horizon.  Using a small test case, we observe that 
MPORAM distributes and/or transfers equipment in anticipation of future demand needs.  
For example, if one unit cannot improve its readiness in one time period, MPORAM 
focuses on improving other units‟ ratings, if possible, regardless of their priorities.  Using 
two realistically-sized cases, we observe that the multi-period solution does not differ 
notably from the single-period solution.  Thus, we cannot make any strong conclusions 
about the added value of MPORAM in these cases.  However, these results are strongly 
influenced by a large gap between supply and demand, and we expect MPORAM to 
improve the single-period solution in more balanced cases. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
1. U.S. Army Organizational Transformation ......................................1 
2. Army Force Generation Model...........................................................3 
3. Equipping Strategy ..............................................................................5 
4. Equipment Readiness Calculation .....................................................6 
5. Current Equipment Distribution Process ..........................................8 
6. Equipping Goals ...................................................................................9 
7. Program Objective Memorandum ...................................................10 
8. Optimal Readiness Allocation Model ...............................................11 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................13 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION ......................................14 
II. MPORAM METHODOLOGY AND DATA...........................................................17 
A. LIMITATIONS ..............................................................................................17 
B. ASSUMPTIONS .............................................................................................17 
C. MODEL DESCRIPTION ..............................................................................18 
D. DATA ..............................................................................................................20 
E. FORMUALTION ...........................................................................................22 
F. MODEL VARIATIONS ................................................................................25 
G. OUTPUT .........................................................................................................26 
H. SOFTWARE ...................................................................................................26 
III. DATA SETS, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ............................................................29 
A. DATA SETS ...................................................................................................29 
1.  Small Test Case ..................................................................................29 
2. Full Test Cases....................................................................................30 
B. ANALYTIC APPROACH.............................................................................31 
C. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ........................................................................32 
1. Results of the Small Test Case ..........................................................32 
2. Analysis of the Small Test Case ........................................................34 
3. Results of Full Test Cases ..................................................................37 
a. Multi-Period SACS Results (FY12-FY17) .............................38 
b. Single-Period SACS Results (FY12) ......................................40 
c. Multi-Period CPM Results (FY13-FY17) ..............................40 
d. Single-Period CPM Results (FY13) .......................................41 
4. Comparison of Full Test Cases .........................................................42 
a. SACS Multi-Period Versus Single-Period (FY12) .................42 
b. CPM Multi-Period Versus Single-Period (FY13) ..................43 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................45 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................45 
1. Ability to Assess a POM Equipping Policy ......................................45 
 viii 
2. Value Relative to ORAM ...................................................................46 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................46 
1. Potential Uses .....................................................................................46 
2. Areas for Further Research ..............................................................47 
APPENDIX:  SMALL TEST CASE DATA ........................................................................49 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................53 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................55 
  
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Graphic of the current equipment distribution process where SSOs work 
independently to improve the unit-LIN S-ratings of the LINs they control.  
After [5]. ............................................................................................................9 
Figure 2. “Aim Point” and other equipping goals aligned with ARFORGEN cycle 
for the Army‟s active and reserve components.  The goal is for units to 
progress from an S-3 rating to an S-2 rating during the train/ready cycle, 
and be equipped to S-1 prior to entering the available pool.  From [3]. ..........10 
Figure 3. Graphic of the ORAM equipment distribution process that pools all 
planned allocations and excess equipment into one inventory and then 
distributes them to maximize unit readiness across all units.  After [5]. .........12 
Figure 4. Small test case results chart with percentage of units in each ARFORGEN 
pool at each readiness level by period, with transfers.  Due to inputs, units 
can only be rated S-1 or S-4.  With MPORAM‟s prescribed 
(re)distribution plan both units achieve S-1 rating for the last three periods...37 
Figure 5. Multi-period (FY12-FY17) SACS results chart with percentage of units at 
each readiness level by ARFORGEN pool and (fiscal) year.  FY12 results 
are better than for the other five years of the POM due a constant number 
of items authorized that year, and programmed purchases of over 200,000 
more items in FY12 than in the rest of the years. ............................................39 
Figure 6. Single-period (FY12) SACS results chart with percentage of units at each 
readiness level by ARFOGREN pool.  These results are nearly identical to 
the multi-period results for FY12.  (See Section III.C.4.a.).............................40 
Figure 7. Multi-period (FY13-FY17) CPM results chart with percentage of units at 
each readiness level by ARFORGEN pool and year.  Readiness ratings do 
not vary significantly from year to year, except FY13. ...................................41 
Figure 8. Single-period (FY13) CPM results chart with percentage of units at each 
readiness level by ARFOGREN pool.  These results are nearly identical to 
the multi-period results for FY13.  (See Section III.C.4.b.) ............................42 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Two fictional units MTOE and equipment on-hand data, and resulting LIN 
S-ratings.  Unit A‟s S-rating is determined by its ERC A LINs with only 
82% of its LINs being S-2 or better and 92% of its LINs being S-3 or 
better, resulting in an S-3 rating.  Unit B‟s S-rating is determined by one 
of its ERC P LINs being S-2 and all of its LINs being S-2 or better, 
resulting in an S-2 rating. ...................................................................................7 
Table 2. MPORAM weights by priority for achieving each unit and LIN S-rating, 
respectively.  S-4 is the default rating and not explicitly modeled.  Unit 
ratings are given priority over LIN ratings.  Ratings are assumed constant 
for all time periods. ..........................................................................................19 
Table 3. MPORAM input file names and description.  These files describe a 
complete problem.  Once the set of units and planning horizon (years) for 
analysis is determined, the rest of the data is drawn from the SACS 
database.  Programmed purchases may also come from a CPM solution. ......21 
Table 4. MPORAM output file names and descriptions.  Every decision variable is 
included in the outputs.  The UnitSummary file is used for presenting 
results and evaluating an equipping policy‟s readiness ratings.  Other files 
can be used for detailed analysis of the solution..............................................26 
Table 5. Total change in items authorized in each year of the original full test cases, 
the number of items programmed for purchase in each year for the SACS 
and CPM data sets, and the difference between them for both data sets.  
Authorizations clearly exceed purchases for both data sets in every year 
except FY12.  We expect this to affect MPORAM‟s ability to determine a 
solution that achieves high readiness ratings. ..................................................31 
Table 6. Small test case unit and unit-LIN data, unit-LIN readiness results and 
resulting unit readiness results for each period.  Available units have the 
highest priority, followed by train/ready (T/R) and reset units, 
respectively.  MPORAM uses the weights (by priority and readiness 
rating) from Table 2.  All units achieve rating S-1 for the last three 
periods. .............................................................................................................33 
Table 7. Total amount of each LIN available for distribution in the small test case 
by programmed purchases, budget purchases, and transfers in each period.  
Programmed purchases are input data while budget purchases and 
transfers are determined by MPORAM decision variables, Blt and Aelut, 
respectively.  MPORAM determines a distribution plan (Table 8) for these 
items to achieve the results of Table 6. ............................................................34 
Table 8. Small test case LIN distribution plan for the items available for 
distribution (Table 7).  The number of items each unit receives or transfers 
by LIN and period is displayed.  This distribution plan produces the 
readiness results shown in Table 6...................................................................35 
 xii 
Table 9. Percentage of unit-LINs and units at each readiness level based on full test 
case inputs.  These data are the baseline: the aggregated initial readiness 
ratings before execution of a POM programmed purchase plan. .....................38 
Table 10. Percentage of each ARFORGEN pool units at each readiness level for the 
single-period and multi-period SACS results in FY12.  Highlighted cells 
indicate a higher percentage than the alternative. ............................................43 
Table 11. Percentage of each ARFORGEN pool units at each readiness level for the 
single-period and multi-period CPM results in FY13.  (There are no 
differences.) .....................................................................................................43 
Table 12. Initial LIN authorizations and on hand data with the resulting LIN S-
ratings for both units of the small test case.  Seven of the eight LINs are S-
4 resulting in both units rated S-4. ...................................................................49 
Table 13. Unit-LIN authorizations and ARFORGEN cycle data for the small test 
case.  Units rotate priorities every period to replicate the ARFORGEN 
cycle and unit authorizations for selected LINs change during the planning 
horizon to replicate changing MTOE authorizations over the POM years. .....51 
Table 14. LIN costs for the small test case (constant for all periods.) .............................51 
Table 15. Budget by period for the small test case. .........................................................51 
Table 16. Programmed purchase data by period, and whether each unit has an 
authorization for a LIN programmed for purchase in each period (1) or not 
(0) for the small test case. ................................................................................52 
 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ARFORGEN Army Force Generation  
BCT Brigade Combat Team 
CPM Capital Planning Model 
ERC Equipment Readiness Code  
FY Fiscal Year 
G-8 FDA Analysis Division of the Army G-8 Force Development 
Directorate 
LIN Line Item Number  
MPORAM Multi-Period Optimal Readiness Allocation Model  
MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment  
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
ORAM Optimal Readiness Allocation Model 
POM Program Objective Memorandum  
SACS Structure and Composition System 
SSO  Systems Synchronization Officer 
T/R Train/Ready  
 
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States Army has undergone unprecedented change in the last decade.  During 
that time the Army has completed an organizational transformation and redesigned its 
deployment policies.  These changes, along with an increase of 107% in Army equipping 
requirements between 2003 and 2011 for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have forced 
the Army to update its equipping policies.   
The Army‟s default equipping objective is to provide as much needed equipment 
as possible to units; however, due to the increased requirements, fiscal constraints and 
other factors, the Army does not have enough equipment to fill all requirements, all of the 
time.   
In 2009, the Analysis division of Army G-8 Force Development Directorate (G-8 
FDA) approached the Naval Postgraduate School‟s (NPS) Operations Research 
department for assistance in developing a model to optimize unit equipment readiness 
levels.  NPS faculty developed the “optimal readiness allocation model” (ORAM) that 
prescribes an optimal, near-term redistribution plan to maximize overall readiness across 
the force.   
ORAM is a single-period model, so equipping decisions lack any projections over 
time.  The Army wishes to assess the impact of long-term equipment purchase decisions 
on unit readiness and to determine an equipment distribution plan to achieve readiness 
goals over several years.  For this reason, G-8 FDA is seeking assistance to develop a 
multi-period ORAM (MPORAM).  This thesis develops such a model.  MPORAM 
accounts for the dynamic nature of unit priorities, budget, and other factors that vary over 
the planning horizon, and determines an equipment distribution plan that maximizes 
readiness across the force over the planning horizon.   
We have used a small test case to verify MPORAM‟s ability to distribute and/or 
transfer equipment in anticipation of future demand needs.  In particular, we observe that 
if one unit cannot improve its readiness in one time period, MPORAM focuses on  
 
 xvi 
improving other units‟ ratings, if possible, regardless of their priorities.  Also, assessing 
penalties for transferring equipment between units is critical to ensure MPORAM does 
not prescribe an unstable equipping policy.   
We have also tested MPORAM on two realistically-sized cases provided by G-8 
FDA.  These cases have been solved for both the entire planning horizon (multi-period) 
and for the first period alone (single-period).  By comparing each multi-period solution 
with its single-period version we observe that no significant differences exist in the 
readiness outputs at the unit level in any of the priorities.  Thus, we cannot make any 
strong conclusions about the added value of MPORAM relative to ORAM.   
This is particular to the cases provided by G-8 FDA: the results are strongly 
influenced by the large difference between the increasing demand for equipment and the 
projected supply of equipment purchased over the planning horizon.  The increasing 
demand for equipment has been heavily influenced by transformation and current 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  At the same time, the current economic situation in 
the United States has constrained the Army‟s ability to purchase the equipment necessary 
to meet those demands. 
With transformation complete and a decrease in the demand for deployed forces 
in future years, coupled with a stronger U.S. economy, the gap between demand and 
supply should decrease.  In that scenario, the results observed in the small test case 
(where the contribution of MPORAM is significant) may be reproduced to a realistic 
case, and we expect MPORAM to determine a distribution plan that differs and improves 
readiness compared to the single-period solution.  We recommend MPORAM to continue 
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The U.S. Army has undergone unprecedented change in the last decade, 
completing an organizational transformation and redesigning its deployment policies.  
These changes and other factors have resulted in a dramatic increase in equipping 
requirements over the last decade, forcing the Army to update its equipping policies.  We 
develop the “multi-period optimal readiness allocation model” (MPORAM) to maximize 
unit equipment readiness across the force over several years.  MPORAM extends an 
earlier single-period model to account for the dynamic nature of unit priorities, budget, 
and other factors that vary over the planning horizon.   
1. U.S. Army Organizational Transformation   
Even though the United States has not faced a peer adversary since the fall of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s, its Army remained a force organized to conduct large-
scale wars against a Soviet-type army throughout the 1990s.  Divisions were the basic 
warfighting organization with corps as the primary headquarters units.  Corps are 
commanded by a lieutenant general (three-star) and commands three to four divisions.  
Divisions are commanded by a major general (two-star) and have about 17,000 soldiers.  
A division usually includes three or four maneuver brigades, each with three maneuver 
battalions, an artillery brigade with three artillery battalions, an aviation (helicopter) 
brigade, a support brigade and other enabler units.  There are two types of divisions, 
heavy and infantry.  Heavy divisions are a mix of: (a) mechanized infantry units equipped 
with tracked armored personnel carriers to quickly bring infantry soldiers to the battle 
and, (b) armor units equipped with tanks to provide overwhelming firepower.  The 
infantry soldier is the fighting force of infantry divisions.  This structure was well-suited 
for defeating past adversaries, but did not fit the operational environment of the new 
millennium.   
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Beginning in the early 2000s, the Army began an organizational transformation 
from this rigid, division-based force, to a modular, brigade combat team (BCT) based 
force.  Today, BCTs are the basic warfighting unit, with divisions as the primary 
headquarters unit.  BCTs are commanded by a colonel and are the maneuver brigades of 
the past augmented with an artillery battalion, support element and other enabler units to 
equip them to conduct major combat operations.  Additionally, a BCT can be augmented 
with different levels and types of other enabling units (military police, engineers, civil 
affairs, etc.) depending on their mission.  There are three types of BCTs: the traditional 
infantry and heavy BCTs, and a new medium BCT.  Medium BCTs were fielded 
beginning in the late 1990s as a force that provided more firepower and mobility than the 
infantry BCTs, but required less support than the heavy BCTs.  The medium BCTs are 
equipped with a wheeled armored personnel carrier (Stryker) to move infantry personnel 
to the battle.  The Army also includes additional enabler units: artillery, engineer, military 
police, aviation, and other supporting brigades that can be organized according to the 
mission requirements and deployed along with BCTs to conduct operations.  
The Army executed this organizational transformation while simultaneously 
conducting operations against an unpredictable adversary in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
enemy in those countries arises from ideological groups (as opposed to nations) that are 
opposed to the United States  These ideological groups are supported by various 
elements, ranging from individual financiers to nations that provide arms and training, 
and operate within countries and localities that provide sanctuary or do not have the 
security forces to eliminate them.  Al Qaeda is the most infamous example of these 
groups.  They attack U.S. elements and their allies with small units and attempt to 
influence the population to oppose U.S. and allied operations.  This type of war has 
forced the United States to alter its objectives.  In addition to killing or capturing enemy 
forces, the United States began focusing on influencing the relevant populations to 
support the United States and its partners and developing security forces in nations so that 
they can reduce the ability of these groups to operate within their borders.  The Army‟s 
force structure for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reflects this new focus.  Engineer, 
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military police, civil affairs and other enabling units are key elements resident within 
every BCT and division deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.   
2. Army Force Generation Model     
The increased requirements for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan necessitated that 
the Army also transform its deployment policies.  From 2001 to 2005, most Army units 
were conducting six-month deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan.  These deployments and 
the high demand for forces in both countries resulted in many units redeploying after only 
six months at home station.  The “six month on, six month off” schedule did not provide 
the stability required for operations.  During the six months of deployment, units were not 
able to establish the battle rhythm and connections with local leaders necessary to 
effectively achieve their objectives.  During the six months at home, units were not able 
to recover their equipment, receive and train new personnel or train for the next 
deployment.  In order to overcome these issues, the Army decided to employ a rotational 
readiness strategy, called the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model [1].  Units 
transition through three force pools in this model: “reset,” “train/ready,” and “available,” 
respectively.     
ARFORGEN was developed to provide stability in deployment cycles during 
operations conducted over many years, like Iraq and Afghanistan.  It is also intended to 
be generic enough to apply to future operations.  “ARFORGEN is a cyclic training and 
readiness strategy that synchronizes strategic planning, prioritization and resourcing to 
generate trained and ready modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint mission 
requirements” [1]. 
Currently units spend two years at their home station (six months in the reset 
phase and 18 months in the train/ready phase) and potentially one year deployed as  
part of the available pool for a total of three years in the cycle.  The reset phase is 
projected to include approximately 1/6 of the operating force.  Units in reset are those 




on reconnecting with families, receiving new personnel, and fixing and maintaining 
equipment from the deployment.  They conduct very limited individual training, such as 
basic marksmanship training.   
After the reset phase, units enter the train/ready phase.  This pool is projected to 
contain approximately half of the operating force.  Units in the train/ready phase begin 
training on unit tactics and operations.  They progress through squad-level training (e.g., 
room clearing operations), platoon- and company-level training (e.g., isolating and 
searching houses) and battalion- and brigade-level training (e.g., isolating and clearing a 
neighborhood or city).  The train/ready phase normally culminates in a capstone training 
exercise conducted at a national training site like Fort Irwin, California, or Fort Polk, 
Louisiana, in order to verify that the unit is prepared to execute their mission before being 
assigned to the available pool.   
During the train/ready phase, some units will be identified and scheduled for 
deployment to a theater of operations, such as Iraq or Afghanistan.  Units scheduled to 
deploy are designated as part of the deployment expeditionary force and are placed under 
the operational control of the headquarters they will report to during their deployment.  
They train on the mission-essential tasks and are assigned a mission-essential equipment 
list specific to the deployment mission.  For example, a BCT scheduled for deployment to 
Afghanistan will be assigned to a division headquarters in that country for reporting 
purposes, train on the tasks they will conduct, and receive the equipment they need for 
operations.   
Units not scheduled for deployment are designated part of the contingency 
expeditionary force.  They remain assigned to their administrative headquarters and train 
on their core, mission-essential tasks with their core equipment requirements. 
Once units have completed the necessary training for scheduled or potential 
deployment, they enter the available pool of units.  This pool is projected to include 
approximately 1/3 of the operating force.  During this phase, forces in the deployment 
expeditionary force deploy in accordance with their deployment schedule.  Units in the 
contingency expeditionary force remain prepared for immediate deployment on any 
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emerging contingency to any theater where they are needed. Once released from the 
available pool, units return to the reset pool to begin the cycle again. 
For potential peace-time environments in the future that do not require high levels 
of deployed forces, the available pool includes a set of units identified as the first 
responders to emerging conflicts.  They are designated the “mission” force and consist of 
one corps and five division headquarters, 20 BCTs, and 90,000 support soldiers [2].   
For potential, extremely-high force demand environments the train/ready pool 
includes a “surge” force in case the demand exceeds the force assigned to the available 
pool.  The surge force consists of one corps and three division headquarters, 10 BCTs, 
and 41,000 support soldiers [2].   
3. Equipping Strategy    
Organizational transformation, implementation of the ARFORGEN model and 
equipment requirements for units in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in an increase of 
107% in Army equipping requirements between 2003 and 2011 [3].  Additionally, there 
are nations that have the economic, technologic and manpower to raise an army to 
challenge the Army in a large-scale war in the future.  Even though the focus of 
operations and policies for the last decade has been operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the Army must ensure future strategies and policies account for these potential large-scale 
wars against peer adversaries.  One of the strategies that needed revision based on current 
operations and the projected future operational environment was the Army‟s equipping 
strategy.  The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, addressed this requirement in 2009 with 
the publication of the fiscal year 2010 (FY10) equipping strategy.  This document 
prescribed a transition from a cold-war, tiered-equipping readiness strategy into one that 
facilitates equipping soldiers and units according to their position in the ARFORGEN 
cycle, enabling them to accomplish their assigned mission [3].  The Army continues to 
procure the equipment necessary to complete the conversion to a BCT-based force.  
However, even with larger budgets, the Army continues to have equipment shortages due 
to the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Fiscal constraints dictate the Army be 
creative in managing the assignment of equipment needed for its operating forces.   
 6 
The Army‟s equipping goal is to ensure soldiers and units have the equipment 
they need, when they need it [3].  The Army‟s default objective is to provide as much 
needed equipment as possible to units; however, the Army does not have enough 
equipment to fill all requirements, all of the time.  A number of collective factors cause 
the Army‟s inability to maintain all units at high equipment readiness ratings.  (See the 
next section for a summary of the Army‟s unit equipment readiness calculation 
procedures.)  The recently published FY11 equipping strategy describes the Army‟s plan 
to mediate these shortages and equip units according to their position in the ARFORGEN 
cycle by allowing lower-priority units (i.e., reset units) to transfer some equipment to 
higher-priority units (i.e., units in the train/ready or available pools).  Additionally, some 
equipment from reset units will be identified for national-level maintenance, 
modernization, or rebuild.   
4. Equipment Readiness Calculation  
The Army determines a unit‟s on-hand equipment readiness based on a number of 
factors.  Items in the Army inventory are identified by an alpha-numeric code called the 
line item number (LIN).  Every unit has a documented requirement for a specific number 
of LINs and the number of items they require for each of those LINs.  This document is 
called the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE).  Each LIN assigned to 
each unit is further identified by an equipment readiness code (ERC) of “A” or “P.”  ERC 
P items are referred to as “pacing” items and “are those major weapon systems, aircraft, 
and other equipment items that are central to the organization‟s ability to 
accomplish/provide core functions/designed capabilities” [4].  They are mission-essential 
equipment.  All other items are assigned ERC A.  ERC A items do not completely 
preclude the unit from accomplishing its designed mission if they are missing.   
For every LIN in every unit, a single LIN S-rating is assigned based on the 
percentage of the required amount of that LIN on hand in that unit: S-1 if the unit has at 
least 90% of the required amount, S-2 if the unit has at least 80%, S-3 if the unit has at 
least 65%, and S-4 if the unit has less than 65% [4].   
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Once all of a unit‟s LIN S-ratings are calculated, a unit S-rating is assigned.  
However, this rating cannot be higher than that of the lowest ERC P LIN S-rating.  A unit 
is assigned S-rating S-1 if all of its ERC P LINs are S-1 and at least 90% of its ERC A 
LINs are S-1; S-2 if all of its ERC P LINs are S-1 or S-2 and at least 85% of its ERC A 
and P LINs are S-1 or S-2; S-3 if none of its ERC P LINs are S-4 and at least 80% of its 
ERC A and P LINs are S-1, S-2 or S-3; and, S-4 if any of its ERC P LINs are S-4 or 
greater than 20% of its ERC A and P LINs are S-4.   










L1000 A 91 100 S-1 -  - 0 - 
L1001 P 191 200 S-1 A 57 60 S-1 
L1002 A 40 50 S-2 P 84 100 S-2 
L1003 A 12 40 S-4 - - 0 - 
L1004 A 88 100 S-2 - - 0 - 
L1005 A 77 90 S-2 A 77 80 S-1 
L1006 A 56 80 S-3 - - 0 - 
L1007 A 83 100 S-2 - - 0 - 
L1008 P 143 150 S-1 - - 0 - 
L1009 A 137 140 S-1 - - 0 - 
L1010 A 256 300 S-2 - - 0 - 
L2000 - - 0 - P 37 40 S-1 
L2003 - - 0 - A 143 150 S-1 
L2004 - - 0 - A 191 200 S-1 
Table 1.   Two fictional units MTOE and equipment on-hand data, and resulting LIN S-
ratings.  Unit A‟s S-rating is determined by its ERC A LINs with only 82% of 
its LINs being S-2 or better and 92% of its LINs being S-3 or better, resulting 
in an S-3 rating.  Unit B‟s S-rating is determined by one of its ERC P LINs 
being S-2 and all of its LINs being S-2 or better, resulting in an S-2 rating.  
Table 1 shows two fictional units‟ MTOE and equipment on-hand data, with the 
resulting LIN and unit S-ratings.  Unit A‟s S-rating is S-3 because all of its P LINs are S-
1 but only nine of its eleven (82%) assigned LINs are S-2 or better and 92% of its LINs 
are S-3 or better.  Unit B is S-2 because one of its P LINs is S-2 and all of its assigned 
LINs are S-2 or better.  This simple example also illustrates that ERC assignment is unit-
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specific: both units have a requirement for L1002, but in unit B it has ERC P, whereas in 
unit A it is considered an ERC A LIN.  For a detailed discussion of S-ratings see [4], 
chapter 9, section 3.    
5. Current Equipment Distribution Process 
Despite the shortage of equipment, the Army‟s process for determining an 
equipment distribution plan has been focused on filling units to 100% of their 
requirements.  Systems synchronization officers (SSOs) within the Army G-8 Force 
Development Directorate are responsible for determining a distribution plan for each item 
to each unit by month in an attempt to achieve this goal.  
SSOs work with the Department of the Army systems coordinators in the office of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, and the 
systems integrators within the Army G-3/5/7.  The Department of the Army systems 
coordinators provides the acquisition and production plan for each item.  The systems 
integrators provide the current on-hand and required amounts for each item by unit.  They 
also provide the unit priorities, according to their position in the ARFORGEN cycle and 
the needs of other units in the same ARFORGEN pool.  There are 81 SSOs organized 
under nine divisions within the G-8 Force Development Directorate Director of Materiel 
division.  They are loosely aligned with the Army war fighting functions (movement and 
maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, command and control and protection). 
Each SSO manages a subset of similar items (e.g., all helicopters).  SSOs attempt 
to determine the best distribution plan by focusing on distributing equipment coming out 
of production, “reset” equipment, and excess unit equipment (units with equipment over 
100% of requirements).  Several factors complicate the SSOs task of determining a 
distribution plan: changing unit priorities from the systems integrators, deviations from 
previous planned unit allocations, delays or changes to the production schedule, changes 
to on-hand amounts due to battle loss or “reset” requirements, and many others.  See 




distribute the items under their control.  Therefore, they attempt to maximize units‟ LIN 
S-ratings, but do not have complete visibility of items and how they affect each unit‟s 
overall rating.   
 
Figure 1.   Graphic of the current equipment distribution process where SSOs work 
independently to improve the unit-LIN S-ratings of the LINs they control.  
After [5]. 
6. Equipping Goals 
The FY11 equipping strategy describes the Army‟s new equipment distribution 
process to align the equipping process with ARFORGEN priorities.  It designates specific 
equipping points, called “aim points,” in the ARFORGEN cycle to ensure operating force 
units have what they need when they need it.  Aim points provide the Army with a means 
to distribute equipment to units in order to achieve a prescribed state of readiness at 
predetermined points in the ARFORGEN cycle.  This, in turn, allows Army leadership to 
make decisions geared to mitigate that risk related to unit equipping.  Figure 2 shows how 
the current aim point goals align with the ARFORGEN cycle for the active and reserve 
components.  For the active component, “Aim Point 1” is the day a unit enters the 
train/ready pool and “Aim Point 2” is six months after “Aim Point 1,” that is, when the 
unit is expected to begin training on unit tactics and operations.  The Chief of Staff of the 
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Army directed that active component units be equipped to S-3 at aim point one and S-2 at 
aim point two.  Additionally, units will be equipped to S-1 prior to entering the available 
pool or assuming the surge force mission, and units in the reset pool will be equipped to 
facilitate the conduct of individual and institutional training [3].  Similar aim points and 
goals are established for the reserve component and Army National Guard units.   
Train/Ready
BOG : DWELL    1:2 (AC)
Days  R+0 R+180 R+365 R+730                                                              R+1095









Strategic Depth Operational Depth
Years R+0 R+1 R+2 R+3 R+4                     R+5
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Train / Ready
 
Figure 2.   “Aim Point” and other equipping goals aligned with ARFORGEN cycle for 
the Army‟s active and reserve components.  The goal is for units to progress 
from an S-3 rating to an S-2 rating during the train/ready cycle, and be 
equipped to S-1 prior to entering the available pool.  From [3]. 
7. Program Objective Memorandum 
The Army publishes a program objective memorandum (POM) in support of the 
Department of Defense‟s planning, programming, budgeting and execution system (See 
[1], chapter 9 for a detailed description.)  This system allocates resources to ensure the 
services have the personnel and equipment necessary to achieve their missions.  The 
POM is one of the key products of the system that describes in detail the Army‟s 
objectives for the programming phase and how it intends to allocate its resources over the  
 
 
Reserve Component and National Guard 
Active Component 
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next six years to achieve those objectives.  For our purposes, the most important aspect of 
the POM is that it includes the number of each LIN planned for purchase in each year of 
the next six planning years.   
8. Optimal Readiness Allocation Model 
In 2009, the Analysis division of Army G-8 Force Development Directorate (G-8 
FDA) approached the Naval Postgraduate School‟s (NPS) Operations Research 
department for assistance in developing a model to optimize unit S-ratings in the Army.  
NPS faculty developed the optimal readiness allocation model (ORAM) to “prescribe an 
optimal, near-term redistribution of equipment to Army units, in order to maximize 
overall readiness across the force” [6].  ORAM maximizes readiness “by determining the 
optimal near-term redistribution of on-hand LINs to other units within a selection of 
theater(s) based on the priority of the receiving unit (the unit‟s position in the 
ARFORGEN cycle) and the marginal increase in a unit‟s readiness” [6].  It calculates the 
LIN and unit S-ratings for each unit and uses these in the objective function to maximize 
a function of weighted S-ratings across all units.   
Increasing unit S-ratings is given priority over LIN S-ratings.  Because LIN S-
ratings are also included in the objective function, the model increases LIN S-ratings 
within a unit, allowing it to improve its LIN S-ratings, even if the unit‟s S-rating does not 
improve.   
ORAM first attempts to increase readiness by redistributing “planned” allocations 
(the allocation of equipment coming off the production line or out of reset), and 
optionally redistributing unit “excess” equipment, but without accounting for 
redistribution costs.  ORAM is solved preemptively, that is, it determines a solution for 
units with highest priority first, and then fixes that solution and solves the model again 
for units in the next priority group, and so on.   
There are factors used by the SSOs‟ equipment distribution plan that cannot be 
accounted for in ORAM.  Thus, ORAM produces an optimistic solution (upper bound) on 
the level of readiness that can be actually achieved.  However, by using a unit S-rating 
focus rather than a LIN S-rating focus, ORAM is able to achieve higher unit S-ratings 
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than the current equipment distribution process.  ORAM seeks to increase unit S-ratings 
by simultaneously considering all unit-LIN combinations in order to maximize unit 
readiness levels across the Army.  Instead of attempting to fill to the LIN requirement and 
potentially increasing one unit‟s LIN S-rating at the expense of another unit‟s unit S-
rating, ORAM “fills to the floor” of LIN S-rating requirements first, leaving more 
equipment available to increase other unit‟s S-ratings.  Because a typical ORAM data set 
results in approximately 150,000 requirements (one for every ERC, LIN and unit 
combination), identifying an optimal solution is not trivial.  Figure 3 depicts ORAM‟s 
equipment distribution process.  All planned equipment allocations and excess equipment 
are identified as equipment available for (re)distribution (inventory) and distributed to 
units in order to maximize unit S-ratings across the force.    
 
Figure 3.   Graphic of the ORAM equipment distribution process that pools all planned 
allocations and excess equipment into one inventory and then distributes 
them to maximize unit readiness across all units.  After [5]. 
ORAM provides leadership a readiness goal that the Army should be able to 
approach, even if it is not realistically achievable.  It has been designed to answer the 
following questions for G-8 FDA and the Army [6]:  
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(1) What “level of readiness” can the Army achieve in the near-term with the 
on-hand LINs available for distribution?  
(2) What allocation of LINs will achieve this maximum readiness?  
(3) What is the minimal redistribution of LINs that will achieve this 
allocation? 
In FY10, G-8 FDA used ORAM for several analyses to answer senior leader 
questions regarding the Army‟s equipping strategy.  Of note, ORAM was used in the aim 
point analysis that the Chief of Staff of the Army used to develop the aim point goals for 
the FY11 equipping strategy. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our problem falls in the well-known, general category of time-phased optimal 
resource allocation [7].  In these problems, one or several limited resources must be 
allocated among various competing needs or activities over time.  In our case, we seek to 
allocate different LINs to several Army units over a pre-determined planning horizon in 
order to maximize the equipment on-hand readiness rating of the units.   
Multiple applications of resource allocation models exist in the areas of facility 
expansion, portfolio management, project management, and production scheduling, 
among others [8].  However, we are not aware of any previous optimization-based 
approach to allocate equipment in the U.S. Army above the tactical unit level.  
The RAND Corporation developed a systems engineering approach to analyze 
equipment serviceability readiness ratings [9].  This approach focuses on identifies 
supply issues that interfere with unit maintenance programs.  For example, they analyze 
maintenance at the battalion level and aggregate the results to a division, but these results 
are not applicable to the Army as a whole.        
Although not explicitly applied to equipment readiness, optimization has been 
applied to training readiness for an Army tank battalion [10] and a Navy “Prowler” 
squadron [11].  Both of these efforts focus on scheduling training events during a 
“peacetime” period in order to maximize training readiness for that period and minimize 
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the days required to become fully trained when alerted for wartime deployment.  Both 
models consist of two periods, a peacetime period that ranges from 30 days for the 
Prowler problem to 120 days for the tank problem, and a wartime period of undefined 
length.  In both cases, only a single tactical unit is affected and Service-wide cases are not 
considered.     
While these methodologies are informative, neither are applicable to a strategic, 
long-term, equipment on-hand readiness problem.  The short-term focus of both methods 
is evident in the peacetime period of a few months followed by an undefined wartime 
period.  By assigning training weights by period, the training models ignore the 
competing demands of different units and the dynamic effects of priorities, budget and 
other factors that change over several years.  MPORAM assign weights by unit priority 
and readiness level in order maximize readiness across the entire Army, over several 
years.  Period weighting could be implemented in MPORAM, but would not be 
significant when compared to the priority and readiness level weights, because they are 
more critical factors than time in the equipment on-hand readiness problem.   
Finally, we are limited to the readiness metric defined by the Army [4].  However, 
for the optimization training models, the authors advocate using different metrics to 
assess readiness: specifically, they argue that readiness should be measured solely by 
time and dollars.  For example, training readiness may be reported by the number of days 
for a unit to become fully-trained, and equipment on-hand readiness may be reported by 
the economic cost for a unit to achieve an S-1 rating.  Our work does not propose using a 
new metric for readiness, but provides insight about different equipping policies effect on 
readiness levels, as they are currently defined. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION 
ORAM is a single-period model, so equipping decisions for units are static, 
lacking any projections over time.  Distributions within a single year neglect effects on 
readiness in the upcoming years of the POM.  The Army needs a method to assess the 
impact of POM equipment purchase decisions on unit S-ratings and to determine a long  
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term equipment distribution plan to achieve unit S-rating goals as units rotate through the 
ARFORGEN cycle.  For this reason, G-8 FDA is seeking assistance to expand ORAM 
into a multi-period model.    
In this thesis, we develop a multi-period version of ORAM (MPORAM) in order 
to answer the following questions for G-8 FDA and the Army: 
1. Given six years of POM data, what distribution plan will maximize the 
level of readiness over the entire POM time horizon?  
2. Given the resolution and uncertainties of the data and decisions in later 
years of the POM, how much does MPORAM improve ORAM? 
The remainder of this document is presented as follows. We develop our approach 
in Chapter II.  This includes our limitations and assumptions, a generic description of the 
data, and the mathematical model formulation.  In Chapter III, we describe the data sets 
used, the results obtained with MPORAM and the analysis of those results.  We include 
an initial assessment on MPORAM‟s added value compared to ORAM.  Chapter IV 
includes our conclusions and recommendations, as well as areas for further research and 
analysis.    
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II. MPORAM METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
A. LIMITATIONS 
We identify the following limitations to the development of MPORAM:   
 Forces modeled:  The variation and scarcity of mission-essential 
equipping data for units in the train/ready and available pools limit 
MPORAM to modeling only contingency expeditionary forces. 
 Planning horizon and time increment:  MPORAM is designed to replicate 
the length of the POM (six years) and uses one-year time increments.  This 
limits the ability to model monthly variations in the MTOE and equipment 
on-hand data and does not reflect the reset pool of the ARFORGEN cycle 
accurately.  However, a one-year increment accurately reflects a budget 
year. 
 Substitutions:  MPORAM mirrors the initial version of ORAM and does 
not account for LIN substitution rules.  Initial research with ORAM 
indicates that allowing for substitutions does not significantly impact 
results.  
 Variability of distribution factors:  There are several distribution factors 
that MPORAM cannot represent, such as changing unit priorities and 
equipment production schedules, equipment “reset” plans, battle loss or 
damage, etc.  Therefore, MPORAM produces an optimistic solution, or 
“upper bound,” on the maximum readiness level achievable.   
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions are necessary for the development of MPORAM:    
 Unit equipment requirements:  We assume the MTOE accurately reflects 
the equipment needed for a unit to accomplish their designed mission.  
This assumption is realistic because unit MTOEs are continually modified 
to reflect modernization efforts that address identified capability gaps.  
The Army is conducting a major MTOE review in FY11 to ensure they 
accurately reflect requirements.  This assumption is necessary because unit 
S-rating calculations are based on these requirements. 
 Unit equipment on-hand:  We assume unit equipment on-hand data in the 
structure and composition system (SACS) database is accurate.  SACS is 
the primary database used by G-8 FDA.  It includes current equipment on 
hand, projected MTOE requirements and programmed purchases, and 
position in the ARFORGEN cycle data for every unit in the Army over the 
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POM years.  The assumption is valid because units report their equipment 
on-hand status monthly.  The assumption is necessary because SACS is 
the database G-8 FDA uses to provide the input data for MPORAM. 
 ARFORGEN assignment:  We assume unit ARFORGEN assignment data 
is accurate and will not vary through the POM years.  The assumption is 
valid because the ARFORGEN model is official Army policy.  We use 
results of the ARFORGEN model to help determine unit priorities in 
MPORAM.  
 Maintenance:  All equipment on hand is assumed to be fully-mission 
capable.  For the time increments modeled in MPORAM this assumption 
is valid because non-mission capable equipment does not stay with units 
for one year.  The assumption is necessary because non-mission capable 
equipment on hand may decrease a unit‟s ability to perform its mission.   
C. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
MPORAM is a prototypic, mixed-integer linear program that addresses the 
Army‟s equipping challenges for the duration of the POM.  It is an extension of ORAM 
that requires modifying the formulation to incorporate the dynamic nature of unit 
equipping priorities, budget, and other factors that vary over the POM years. 
The objective of MPORAM is to maximize unit readiness by determining 
equipment (re)distribution plan for every year of the POM.  There are many ways to 
measure unit readiness; for example, the number of units rated S-1, a weighted sum of 
unit S-ratings across all units, a weighted sum of unit S-ratings and LIN S-rating across 
all units, a weighted sum of LIN S-Ratings across all units, among others [6]. 
Like ORAM, MPORAM measures readiness as a weighted sum of unit S-ratings 
and LIN S-ratings across all units, but MPORAM expands it over the years of the 
planning horizon.  Unit S-ratings weights are assigned based on the priority of the unit.  
A similar construct is used to assign each unit‟s LIN S-rating weights.   
Solving the single-period ORAM preemptively by priority effectively assigns 
priority-1 units infinite more weight than priority-2 units, and priority-2 units infinite 
more weight than priority-3 units.  With priorities accounted for by this preemption, 
weights in ORAM are then assigned to favor the highest S-ratings for units and LINs.   
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MPORAM also favors higher ratings but the preemptive scheme cannot be applied 
because ARFORGEN priorities change from one year to the next.   
Table 2 provides the unit and LIN S-rating weights, respectively, used by 
MPORAM.  Like ORAM, these weights reflect that increasing unit S-ratings is given 
priority over increasing LIN S-ratings in MPORAM.  LIN S-ratings are included in the 
objective to give the model incentive to improve LIN S-ratings within a unit, even if its 
unit S-rating cannot improve.  For now, these weights remain constant for the duration of 
the model, i.e., achieving S-rating S-1 for a priority-1 unit in the first year is the same as 
that in the last year.    
  Priority 
Unit S-Rating 1 2 3 
S-1 120 100 45 
S-2 95 60 20 
S-3 30 15 12 
  Priority 
LIN S-Rating 1 2 3 
S-1 12 10 4.5 
S-2 9.5 6 2 
S-3 3 1.5 1.2 
Table 2.   MPORAM weights by priority for achieving each unit and LIN S-rating, 
respectively.  S-4 is the default rating and not explicitly modeled.  Unit ratings 
are given priority over LIN ratings.  Ratings are assumed constant for all time 
periods. 
In order to discourage unnecessary redistribution, MPORAM includes a penalty 
in the objective function for redistributing equipment between units.  A penalty is 
assessed for every item redistributed from a unit to another.  (These penalties may also be 
used as a surrogate for redistribution costs.)  In the current formulation, all penalties are 
equal, but these could be modified to better reflect Army preferences.  
MPORAM determines an optimal (re)distribution of equipment to maximize unit 
readiness across the Army adhering to the following specifications: 
 The allocation of each LIN in each time period is restricted to the total 
distributions available in that period, including purchases and transfers. 
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 Purchases in each period are limited by the budget for that period.  
 LIN inventories in each unit and year must be represented. 
 LIN and unit S-ratings must be calculated (including influence of ERC P 
LIN S-ratings on unit S-ratings). 
See Section II.E for the complete formulation of the model.          
D. DATA 
G-8 FDA formats and provides all data for the model via the SACS database.  
First, they determine the set of units and the years they wish to analyze.  For example, 
they may choose to analyze only active duty units stationed in the United States over the 
next six years.  With the set of units and years established, they build a series of data files 
(see Table 3) that describe a complete problem. 
For programmed purchases data, G-8 FDA may also use another optimization 
model developed by NPS called the capital planning model (CPM).  CPM helps 
determine the portfolio of options to fund for the programmed budget in the POM years 
and was used by the Army staff to inform development of the POM in FY11.  CPM 
recommends equipment to purchase over the POM years and other equipment funding 
decisions such as equipment modernization and reset [12].  Equipment in CPM is not 
modeled at the LIN level, but the solution can be mapped to a set of LINs to purchase for 
each year of the POM.  This set of LINs can be used as the programmed purchase data 
for MPORAM.  Since CPM does not determine the set of LINs to purchase (but an 
equipment strategy based on many other factors that affect equipment funding decisions), 
option values in CPM are not assigned by their effect on equipment readiness.  For this 
reason, G-8 FDA may use MPORAM to determine the effect of CPM and other POM 







Unit the set of units 
ARFORGEN 
the set of unit priorities, typically priority-1 (available pool units), 
priority-2 (train/ready units), and priority-3 (reset units) 
Period the set of time periods (normally six years to reflect a POM cycle) 
UnitCycle each unit's priority by period 
ERC the set of ERCs (preloaded A and P) 
Budget the budget for each period 
LIN the set of LINs authorized by the units during the analysis years 
Cost the cost of each LIN (constant across all periods) 
Readiness 
the unit and LIN readiness ratings (preloaded S-1, S-2 and S-3.  S-4 is the 
default and not explicitly modeled) 
Delta 
each unit's change, from the previous period, to LIN authorizations in the 
current period 
Num 
the unit S-rating metrics for every S-rating and unit in every period, by 
ERC 
Per 
the LIN S-rating metrics for every S-rating and unit-LIN combination in 
every period, by ERC 
Avail the number of each LIN programmed for purchase in each period  
POM 
the units that have authorizations for the LINs programmed for purchase 
in each period 
Pt the penalties for redistributing each LIN, by ERC 
Req each unit's initial authorization for all of its LINs 
Oh each unit's initial on-hand data for all its required LINs 
Table 3.   MPORAM input file names and description.  These files describe a complete 
problem.  Once the set of units and planning horizon (years) for analysis is 
determined, the rest of the data is drawn from the SACS database.  
Programmed purchases may also come from a CPM solution. 
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E. FORMUALTION 
MPORAM‟s formulation is organized in standard mathematical programming 
format [13], adhering to the specifications and data described above in this chapter.   
Indices  
e   ERC category 
l  LIN  
s  S-rating (S-4 is the default and not explicitly represented in the 
model) 
u   unit  
t   time period (one year increments) 
p  priority   
Data [units] 
spval  weight of having a unit with priority p at rating s [rating] (remains 
constant across all t) 
elspvalL  weight of having LIN l, category e, in a unit with priority p at 
rating s [rating] (remains constant across all t) 
elupt  
penalty for taking away LIN l, category e from unit u (set to 1.0 in 
all of our test cases)  
ltavail   number of LIN l available to distribute to units in period t [item]  
lcost   cost for each item l [$/item] (constant across all time periods) 
tbudget  dollars available for purchases in period t [$] 
eluoh   initial number of LIN l, category e, assigned to unit u [item] 
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elsutper  number of LIN l, category e, required by unit u to achieve LIN S-
rating s in period t [item] 
sutnum  number of LINs at LIN S-rating s required by unit u to achieve unit 
S-rating s in period t [item] 
elutauth  
number of LIN l, category e authorized by unit u in period t [item]
 
Other Sets and Derived Sets  
UTP
 
 subset of triplets (u, t, p) where unit u has priority p in period t 
ELUT
 
derived subset of quadruplets (e, l, u, t) where unit u has a 
requirement for LIN l, category e in period t, i.e., if  > 0elutauth .    
 
ELU  derived subset of triplets (e, l, u) where unit u has a requirement 
for LIN l category e in some period 
Decision Variables [units] 
sutV  binary variable with value 1 if unit u is at rating s during period t 
(results of period t plan) 
elsutR  binary variable with value 1 if LIN l, category e, for unit u is at 
rating s during period t (results of period t plan) 
elutA  
number of LIN l, category e to take away from unit u at the 
beginning of period t [item] 
elutX  number of LIN l, category e, distributed to unit u at the beginning 
of period t [item]  
ltB   number of LIN l to purchase at the beginning of period t [item]  
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The model determines a unit distribution plan ( tX , tB , and  tA  
) for all units, 
attempting to increase the unit S-rating for the current period t through an increase in the 
current inventory, tI , while at the same time attempting not to penalize the unit S-rating 
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for future periods.  The unit readiness level at the beginning of t is based on a unit‟s 
inventory at the end of the previous period ( 1tI ).    
Constraint set (1) restricts the LIN allocation in each period to the total 
distributions available in that period, including purchases and transfers.  Constraint set (2) 
limits purchases to the available budget in each period.  Constraint sets (3) and (4) restrict 
the inventory of each unit-LIN combination to its inventory in the previous period plus 
the impact of the (re)distribution plan for the current period.  Constraint set (5) restricts a 
unit-LIN rating based on the number of the LIN assigned to the unit in that period.  
Constraint set (6) allows at most one unit-LIN rating in each period.  Constraint set (7) 
restricts a unit rating to be no better than a unit-LIN rating for pacing LINs in each 
period.  Constraint set (8) restricts a unit rating based on the number of unit-LIN ratings 
in each period.  Constraint set (9) allows at most on unit rating in each period.  Constraint 
set (10) is used to bound variables. 
F. MODEL VARIATIONS 
Slight variations of MPORAM can be made in order to achieve various analytic 
objectives.  Two MPORAM variations are implemented together for analysis in this 
thesis.  They work together to isolate the effect of POM equipping policies on unit 
readiness.  First, we prevent transferring equipment between units in MPORAM by fixing 
all  = 0elutA .  Second, we create LUT, a derived subset of triplets (l, u, t) where unit u has 
an authorization in period t for LIN l programmed for purchase in period t.  We then fix 
 = 0 for each  and each ( , , )  elutX e l u t LUT .  This prevents MPORAM from allocating 
equipment to units that do not have an authorization for the LINs programmed for 
purchase every year.  These two adjustments work together to allow analysis of the effect 
of distributing the LINs programmed for purchase in the POM.   
These are just two examples of many potential variations that could be used to 
address specific objectives.  Variations typically involve a restriction of the original 
problem and reduce computational time.   
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G. OUTPUT 
MPORAM output recommends a (re)distribution plan to maximize unit readiness 
according to their priorities across all time periods.  The amount of each LIN that each 
unit gains ( elutX ) or transfers to another unit ( elutA ) in every period, the LIN purchase 
plan (
ltB ) for each period, and the resulting unit ( sutV ) and unit-LIN S-ratings ( elsutR ) are 
included in the output files.  The impact of POM decisions on unit readiness are the key 
findings of interest to G-8 FDA so the results presented in Chapter III are focused on unit 
readiness ratings. 
Table 4 lists the MPORAM output files and gives a description of each one.   
File Description 
Gainers the amount of each LIN that each unit gains (Xelut) or transfers (Aelut) in 
every period 
LINSRate 
the S-rating results of the solution for every unit-LIN combination in 
every period based on its inventory in that period (Relsut and Ielut) 
Objective the final objective function value of the model solution 
Penalties 
the amount of each LIN transferred from each unit in every period and 
the resulting penalty (product of Aelut and ptelu) 
Purchases 
the amount of each LIN purchased in each period and the budget for that 
period (Blt) 
UnitSRate the S-rating results of the solution for every unit in every period (Vsut) 
UnitSummary 
summary file that includes unit data and results for each period: priority, 
count of ERC A and P LINs, worst ERC P LIN S-rating, count of LINs 
at each LIN S-rating and the resulting unit S-rating   
Table 4.   MPORAM output file names and descriptions.  Every decision variable is 
included in the outputs.  The UnitSummary file is used for presenting results 
and evaluating an equipping policy‟s readiness ratings.  Other files can be 
used for detailed analysis of the solution.     
H. SOFTWARE 
MPORAM is implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling System and uses 
the CPLEX solver [14].  The typical full case instance (see Section III.A) includes 4.9 to 
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5.8 million constraints and 8.7 to 11.4 million variables (of which, between 2.9 and 3.4 
million are binary.)  CPLEX pre-solves the problem to drastically reduce the dimension 
to between 164,000 and 317,000 constraints and between 175,000 and 309,000 variables 
(of which, between 152,000 and 253,000 are binary.)  Solve times (to within one percent 
of optimality) range from approximately one hour to three hours on a 3.2 giga-Hertz 
computer with 12.0 giga-bytes of random access memory.  
 
 28 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 29 
III. DATA SETS, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. DATA SETS 
We use a small test case and two full test cases to analyze MPORAM‟s ability to 
determine a multi-period distribution plan to maximize readiness over the POM years.  
The small test case has been developed by the author.  It has allowed a detailed solution 
analysis with which to verify the implementation of the model formulation.  G-8 FDA 
has provided the full test data sets to ensure MPORAM can be solved for a typical data 
set they may need to analyze.   
1.  Small Test Case 
The small test case is a modified subset of the single-period ORAM data.  We 
include data for subsequent periods to stress the model‟s ability to increase readiness.  
For this case, we assume two units and four assigned LINs.  Both units require the same 
four LINs except that one unit has one ERC P requirement and three ERC A 
requirements, while the other unit has all ERC A requirements.  Both units‟ 
authorizations for some of their LINs change after the third period, which allows us to 
test the model‟s ability to account for changes in future authorizations.   
The initial unit S-rating for both units is S-4, with seven of the eight unit-LIN 
combinations rated S-4.  We set these initial conditions in order to test MPORAM‟s 
ability to improve readiness over the planning horizon.  In order to replicate the 
ARFORGEN cycle, we ensure that the two units have different priorities in every period 
and rotate through the priority levels during the planning horizon.  To test MPORAM‟s 
ability to determine a distribution plan for programmed purchases, we vary the amount of 
each LIN available for distribution in each period (as the POM does).  The small test case 
data set also includes a budget for each period to test the model‟s ability to determine a 
LIN purchase plan that improves readiness.  The complete data set for this case can be 
found in the Appendix.     
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2. Full Test Cases 
Two original full test cases have been provided by G-8 and include all of the 
1,911 active duty units stationed in the continental United States and their 2,085 assigned 
LINs.  The full test cases include data for each year of the upcoming POM, FY12 through 
FY17, including unit authorizations and priorities, LINs programmed for purchase, and 
the budget available.  Subsequently, we create two other full cases restricted to the first 
year of data available.     
The difference between the two original full test cases is the source of the 
programmed purchase data: the first one, “SACS,” uses the SACS database, while the 
second, “CPM,” uses a CPM solution.  The SACS database includes programmed 
purchase data for every year, while CPM is designed to provide a solution for every year 
of the POM, except for the next year.  For this reason, the SACS restricted full case uses 
FY12 data, while the CPM restricted full case uses FY13 data.  Programmed purchase 
data represents the supply of equipment available to satisfy equipment demands.      
An initial review of the SACS and CPM programmed purchase data files shows 
significant differences (see Table 5).  These differences are expected: the CPM solution 
seeks to determine an equipping policy that maximizes the value of the policy for the 
entire POM, while the SACS data is focused on equipping the Army in the next year.  
Unit authorizations represent equipment demands.  These authorizations increase 
or decrease from year to year.  We use the total change in unit-LIN authorizations as a 
metric for how equipment demands are changing over the POM years.  Reviewing the 
unit authorizations data for the POM years reveals that, starting in FY13, the total change 
in items authorized increases every year by at least 396,000 items.   
Table 5 shows the increase in items authorized (the demand) in the original full 
test cases, programmed purchases (the supply), and the difference between the demand 
and supply for each fiscal year.  We see that in every year, except FY12, the demand 
exceeds the supply by between 274,000 and 406,000 items.   
From this imbalance, we expect that MPORAM will not be able to identify a 
solution that results in high readiness ratings for all units across the POM.  It should 
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perform better in the first period of the SACS case because there is no increase in demand 
in FY12 in those data.  We expect the readiness results to decrease every year for the rest 
of the POM because of the increasing difference between demand and supply for both 
data sets.  












0 121,844 105,005 103,052 105,049 109,090 544,040 
SACS 
Difference 
(336,133) 303,128 356,490 386,625 391,807 406,126 1,508,043 
CPM 
Difference 
0 274,549 326,124 360,746 360,926 360,169 1,682,514 
Table 5.   Total change in items authorized in each year of the original full test cases, the 
number of items programmed for purchase in each year for the SACS and 
CPM data sets, and the difference between them for both data sets.  
Authorizations clearly exceed purchases for both data sets in every year 
except FY12.  We expect this to affect MPORAM‟s ability to determine a 
solution that achieves high readiness ratings.   
B. ANALYTIC APPROACH 
First, we solve the small test case to verify MPORAMs ability to assess a POM 
equipping policy and to gather insights about how and why it determines a solution to 
maximize unit readiness. 
Second, we use MPORAM to solve both original full test cases for the entire 
planning horizon (multi-period), and then for the restricted full test cases (single-period.)  
We compare the results of the first period of the multi-period results to the single-period 
results to gather insights about the value of MPORAM relative to ORAM.  Using single-
period input files, MPORAM replicates the formulation and modeling of ORAM with the 
one caveat discussed in Section II.C: due to the preemptive scheme applied in ORAM, 
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weights are assigned by rating only, with higher priorities weighted infinitely more than 
any lower priority.  Since, MPORAM cannot solve preemptively, weights are assigned by 
rating and priority.   
The MPORAM weighting scheme is similar to ORAM‟s, but not identical.  Still, 
we assume that the MPORAM results for a single period data set are an acceptable proxy 
for ORAM results for the same period.  With this assumption, if we observe different 
results (in either of the full test cases) in the single-period version than the first period of 
the multi-period version, we can conclude that MPORAM is necessary to assess a POM 
equipping policy.  (Note the converse is not necessarily true.)   
C. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
1. Results of the Small Test Case 
The size of this test case allows detailed analysis and presentation of the 
MPORAM results.  The complete unit readiness results for each period are shown in 
Table 6.  It includes each unit‟s position in the ARFORGEN cycle, LIN counts (total and 
by ERC), worst ERC P S-rating, count of LINs at each rating, and resulting unit S-rating.   
Highlighted cells are periods when the units achieve an S-1 rating. 
Because both units in the small test case have less than five LINs assigned in each 
period, the only unit ratings achievable are S-1 or S-4.  For a unit to achieve S-1, all of its 
LINs must be rated S-1, otherwise it becomes S-4.  This extreme characteristic, coupled 
with the other data being designed to stress the model, emphasizes how MPORAM 
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U01842 1 Available 4 1 3 4 0 0 0 4 4 
U01842 2 Reset 4 1 3 3 0 1 2 1 4 
U01842 3 T/R 4 1 3 1 2 0 1 1 4 
U01842 4 Available 3 1 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 
U01842 5 Reset 3 1 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 
U01842 6 T/R 3 1 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 
U05386 1 T/R 4 0 4 1 4 0 0 0 1 
U05386 2 Available 4 0 4 1 4 0 0 0 1 
U05386 3 Reset 4 0 4 1 4 0 0 0 1 
U05386 4 T/R 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 
U05386 5 Available 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 
U05386 6 Reset 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 
Table 6.   Small test case unit and unit-LIN data, unit-LIN readiness results and resulting 
unit readiness results for each period.  Available units have the highest 
priority, followed by train/ready (T/R) and reset units, respectively.  
MPORAM uses the weights (by priority and readiness rating) from Table 2.  
All units achieve rating S-1 for the last three periods.    
The total amount of each LIN available for distribution in each period is shown in 
Table 7.  Equipment available for distribution in each period is composed of the 
programmed purchase data input and part of the MPORAM solution: the purchase 
variable, Blt, and the transfer variable, Aelut.  LIN-period combinations not listed here 











Purchases Transfers Total 
A20044          1 20 0 5 25 
A20044          2 20 1 0 21 
A20044          3 20 2 0 22 
A20044          4 20 2 55 77 
A20044          5 20 3 0 23 
A20044          6 20 4 0 24 
C68719 1 0 0 17 17 
C68719 2 0 1 0 1 
C68719 4 0 1 0 1 
C68719 5 0 1 0 1 
C68719 6 0 1 0 1 
D02704         1 2 0 0 2 
D02704         2 2 0 0 2 
D02704         3 2 0 0 2 
D02704         4 0 0 2 2 
M12418        1 60 0 19 79 
M12418        2 50 0 0 50 
M12418        3 40 0 0 40 
M12418        4 30 0 0 30 
M12418        5 20 0 0 20 
M12418        6 10 0 0 10 
Table 7.   Total amount of each LIN available for distribution in the small test case by 
programmed purchases, budget purchases, and transfers in each period.  
Programmed purchases are input data while budget purchases and transfers 
are determined by MPORAM decision variables, Blt and Aelut, respectively.  
MPORAM determines a distribution plan (Table 8) for these items to achieve 
the results of Table 6. 
2. Analysis of the Small Test Case 
Analyzing these results, along with a detailed knowledge of the input data allows 
us to identify several characteristics of the MPORAM solution that is critical for our 
understanding before moving to the solution of the full test cases.  MPORAM‟s unit 
(re)distribution plan for the small test case is presented in Table 8.  It shows number of 
items by LIN that units receive (gain) or transfer (lose) in each period.  MPORAM 
determines this distribution plan to achieve the readiness levels presented in Table 6. 
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Period Unit LIN ERC  Change 
1 U01842 A20044 A -5 
1 U05386 A20044 A 25 
1 U01842 C68719 A -17 
1 U05386 C68719 A 17 
1 U05386 D02704 A 2 
1 U01842 M12418 A -19 
1 U05386 M12418 A 79 
2 U01842 A20044 A 21 
2 U05386 C68719 A 1 
2 U01842 M12418 A 50 
2 U01842 D02704 P 2 
3 U01842 A20044 A 22 
3 U01842 M12418 A 6 
3 U05386 M12418 A 34 
3 U01842 D02704 P 2 
4 U01842 A20044 A 77 
4 U05386 A20044 A -55 
4 U05386 C68719 A 1 
4 U05386 D02704 A -2 
4 U05386 M12418 A 30 
4 U01842 D02704 P 2 
5 U01842 A20044 A 23 
5 U05386 C68719 A 1 
5 U05386 M12418 A 20 
6 U01842 A20044 A 24 
6 U05386 C68719 A 1 
6 U05386 M12418 A 10 
Table 8.   Small test case LIN distribution plan for the items available for distribution 
(Table 7).  The number of items each unit receives or transfers by LIN and 
period is displayed.  This distribution plan produces the readiness results 
shown in Table 6. 
We observe the following:     
 First, if one unit cannot improve its readiness in one time period, 
MPORAM focuses on improving the other unit‟s rating, if possible, regardless of 
priorities.  The results of Table 8 show this in the first period when the priority-1 
unit, U01842, cannot achieve S-1 unit rating due to its ERC P LIN.  MPORAM 
prescribes a distribution plan that achieves an S-1 rating for U05386, even though 
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the unit has priority-2.  As the detailed solution in Table 8 shows, U01842 does 
not receive any equipment in the first period: instead, the unit transfers some 
equipment to U05386, decreasing one of its LIN S-ratings to S-4, in order to 
facilitate improving U05386‟s S-rating.   
 Second, MPORAM is accounting for future priorities.  This is shown by 
the solution focusing on U05386 in the first period when it will become priority-1 
in the next period.  Then, again in the second period, the solution begins to 
allocate equipment to U01842 to facilitate it achieving S-1 rating in the next 
period when it will be priority-1 again (i.e., for the fourth period).   
 Third, MPORAM is accounting for future authorizations.  This is shown 
in Table 8 when U01842 does not receive LIN C68719 in the first three periods 
because the authorization becomes zero for the rest of the periods beginning in the 
fourth period.  Then, again in the second period, the solution begins assigning 
D02704 to U01842 to account for its increase in authorizations, which occurs in 
the fourth period.   
 Fourth, assessing penalties for transfers is critical to ensure MPORAM 
does not prescribe a turbulent equipping policy.  Without these penalties the test 
solution unnecessarily moves the same equipment between units from one period 
to the next.     
Figure 4 is the standard MPORAM results chart for the small test case.  It shows 
the percentage of units in each ARFORGEN pool at each S-rating for each period of the 
model.  For the small test case, the chart does not provide additional insights to those 
already discussed.  But for the full test cases, similar charts display results that are not 
easily identified from the output files.  
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Figure 4.   Small test case results chart with percentage of units in each ARFORGEN 
pool at each readiness level by period, with transfers.  Due to inputs, units 
can only be rated S-1 or S-4.  With MPORAM‟s prescribed (re)distribution 
plan both units achieve S-1 rating for the last three periods.    
3. Results of Full Test Cases 
The results of the full test cases are organized by the data set (SACS or CPM) and 
the planning horizon (single- or multi-period).  To create the restricted, single-period data 
sets we have removed all data from the original multi-period cases except for the first 
period data.     
G-8 FDAs primary purpose for MPORAM is to assess the effect of a POM 
programmed purchase plan on long-term unit readiness.  For the full test cases, we 
implement the two model variations discussed in Section II.F, preventing unit transfers 
and allowing units to receive only the LINs they are authorized (and that are programmed 
for purchase) in each year.     
The aggregated starting unit and unit-LIN readiness statistics are presented in 
Table 9.  These statistics are the baseline for MPORAM: they illustrate the unit and unit-
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LIN readiness levels prior to the distribution of items in a POM programmed purchase 
plan.  They include the percentage of the total number of units and unit-LIN 
combinations at each readiness level.  We note that high unit-LIN S-ratings (87% of the 
unit-LIN combinations rated S-1) do not result in high unit S-ratings (only 46% of the 
units rated S-1).  This result illustrates the strong influence of ERC P LINs on unit 
readiness. 
  S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 Total # 
% of Unit-LINS 87% 1% 1% 11% 170,752 
% of Units 46% 25% 14% 16% 1,911 
Table 9.   Percentage of unit-LINs and units at each readiness level based on full test 
case inputs.  These data are the baseline: the aggregated initial readiness 
ratings before execution of a POM programmed purchase plan.   
a. Multi-Period SACS Results (FY12-FY17) 
Figure 5 shows the multi-period results for the SACS data set.  The chart 
shows that in the first period, FY12, the solution is better than it is for the rest of the 
POM.  In FY12, 59% of the available units are S-1, but in FY13 this percentage drops 
significantly, to only 36%.  At the same time, available units at S-4 increase from 10% to 
21%.  For the last five years, these percentages continue to worsen, finishing with 34% of 




Figure 5.   Multi-period (FY12-FY17) SACS results chart with percentage of units at 
each readiness level by ARFORGEN pool and (fiscal) year.  FY12 results 
are better than for the other five years of the POM due a constant number of 
items authorized that year, and programmed purchases of over 200,000 
more items in FY12 than in the rest of the years.    
These results are expected, due to the two characteristics of the input data 
discussed in Section III.A.2: the decrease of over 200,000 items available for distribution 
from FY12 to FY13 and the yearly increase of almost 400,000 items authorized that 
begins in FY13.  However, they show that MPORAM cannot allocate some of the 
equipment available for distribution in FY12 to other units in order to achieve readiness 
levels that do not vary so much from year to year across the POM years.  An alternate 
solution could have sacrificed some readiness in FY12 to achieve higher readiness levels 
in the last five years.  The prescribed distribution plan does result in readiness levels that 
do not vary much over the last five years of the POM.  This could be a result of the less 
volatile programmed purchase data over the last five years (a decrease of only 30,000 
items purchased from FY13 to FY17 versus the decrease of over 200,000 items between 
FY12 and FY13).  The higher readiness levels in FY12 could also be influenced by the 
lack of an increase in authorizations that year.  For the rest of the POM years 
authorizations increase by at least 396,000 items every year.    
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b. Single-Period SACS Results (FY12) 
Single-period SACSs results for FY12 are presented in Figure 6.  The 
results show high ratings for available pool units with almost 85% achieving S-1 or S-2.  
In Section III.C.4.a, we compare the single-period results to the multi-period results 
presented in the previous section. 
 
Figure 6.   Single-period (FY12) SACS results chart with percentage of units at each 
readiness level by ARFOGREN pool.  These results are nearly identical to 
the multi-period results for FY12.  (See Section III.C.4.a.)         
c. Multi-Period CPM Results (FY13-FY17) 
Figure 7 shows the multi-period results for the CPM data set.  The chart 
shows that the solution achieves readiness levels that do not vary much over the five-year 
planning horizon. The results are slightly worse in the first period, FY13, than for the rest 
of the POM.  In FY13, 21% of the available units are S-1 and in FY14 this percentage 
rises to 31%.  Then, it decreases to 25% in FY16 and finishes at 27% in FY17.  At the 
same time the percent of available units at S-4 rises each year, starting at 25% in FY13 
and finishing at 34% in FY17.  The results are similar for the other ARFORGEN pools.   
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Figure 7.   Multi-period (FY13-FY17) CPM results chart with percentage of units at 
each readiness level by ARFORGEN pool and year.  Readiness ratings do 
not vary significantly from year to year, except FY13.    
Since CPM has been designed to develop an equipping policy that 
maximizes value across the entire POM, the relative lack of variation in readiness levels 
from year to year is expected.  The worse overall unit rating in the first period, FY13, 
could be due to an increase in items authorized of over 396,000 items in FY13 compared 
to programmed purchases of only 121,000 items in FY13.       
d. Single-Period CPM Results (FY13) 
Single-period CPM results are presented in Figure 8.  The results show 
average ratings, with less than 50% of the available pool units achieving S-1 or S-2.  In 
Section III.C.4.b, we compare the single-period results to the multi-period results 
presented in the previous section. 
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Figure 8.   Single-period (FY13) CPM results chart with percentage of units at each 
readiness level by ARFOGREN pool.  These results are nearly identical to 
the multi-period results for FY13.  (See Section III.C.4.b.)   
4. Comparison of Full Test Cases   
Below we compare the single-period results for the first period to the multi-period 
results for the same period in both the SACS and CPM data sets.  This comparison gives 
us insights about whether MPORAM provides a significantly different solution than 
single-period ORAM.                   
a. SACS Multi-Period Versus Single-Period (FY12) 
Comparing the SACS multi-period results for FY12 to the single-period 
results for FY12 shows no significant differences.  There are slight differences in a few of 
the ARFORGEN pool-readiness combinations but never for more than four units.  None 
of these minor deviations results in a change of more than 1% of the total units in that 
ARFORGEN pool-readiness level combination.  Table 10 shows these results by the 
percentage of units in each ARFORGEN pool at each readiness level.  The highlighted 
cells indicate a higher percentage than the alternative.  None of these differences are 
significant.  Thus, no definitive conclusion about the advantage of MPORAM versus 
ORAM can be drawn from this comparison. 
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SACS Single Period Results (FY12) 
    Readiness 
Period Priority   S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 
FY12 Available 59% 24% 7% 10% 
  T/R 34% 31% 14% 21% 
  Reset 58% 18% 9% 14% 
SACS Multi-Period Results (FY12) 
    Readiness 
Period Priority   S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 
FY12 Available 59% 24% 6% 10% 
  T/R 33% 32% 13% 22% 
  Reset 58% 19% 9% 14% 
Table 10.   Percentage of each ARFORGEN pool units at each readiness level for the 
single-period and multi-period SACS results in FY12.  Highlighted cells 
indicate a higher percentage than the alternative. 
b. CPM Multi-Period Versus Single-Period (FY13) 
Comparing the CPM multi-period results for FY13 to the single-period 
results for FY13 also shows no significant differences.  There are differences of at most 
two units in a few of the ARFORGEN pool-readiness level combinations but none of 
these minor differences results in a in a change in the percentage of the total units in that 
ARFORGEN pool-readiness level combination.  Table 11 shows these results by the 
percentage of units in each ARFORGEN pool at each readiness level.  As in the SACS 
comparison, the lack of differences does not allow us to draw a conclusion about the 
benefit of using MPORAM.   
CPM Single- and Multi-Period Results (FY13) 
    Readiness 
Period Priority   S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 
FY13 Available 21% 23% 30% 25% 
  T/R 18% 28% 25% 29% 
  Reset 21% 26% 31% 21% 
Table 11.   Percentage of each ARFORGEN pool units at each readiness level for the 
single-period and multi-period CPM results in FY13.  (There are no 
differences.)       
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS  
This thesis has developed MPORAM to address the Army‟s need for a method to 
assess the impact of POM equipment purchase decisions on unit S-ratings and to 
determine a long term equipment distribution plan to achieve unit S-rating goals as units 
rotate through the ARFORGEN cycle.    
Based on the results and analysis presented in Chapter III, we describe our 
conclusions about MPORAM‟s ability to assess a POM equipping policy and its value 
relative to ORAM.   
1. Ability to Assess a POM Equipping Policy  
The results of the small test case show that MPORAM determines an optimal 
distribution plan that maximizes unit readiness over a six-year planning horizon while 
adhering to the model specifications. 
Solving the small test case has allowed us to identify four key insights about the 
MPORAM solution: first, when one unit‟s readiness rating cannot improve, MPORAM 
attempts to improve another unit‟s readiness rating, regardless of priorities.  The solution 
prescribed may even sacrifice LIN readiness ratings in a higher priority unit to achieve 
higher unit readiness ratings in a lower priority unit; second, MPORAM is accounting for 
future priorities; third, MPORAM is accounting for future authorizations; and fourth, 
penalties for transferring equipment between units are critical to avoid turbulent 
distribution plans.       
Solving MPORAM for the full test cases ensures that it is capable of determining 
an optimal solution for a typical data set G-8 FDA would analyze.  Since detailed 
analysis of the output files is very difficult, it is important to investigate overall output 
statistics with an understanding of the input in order to establish some conclusions.  The 
input file statistics calculated for this research include: first, the change in items 
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authorized by year (the demand), the number of items programmed for purchase by year 
(the supply), and the difference between the demand and supply by fiscal year (Table 5); 
and second, the initial percentage of unit-LIN combinations, and units at each readiness 
level (Table 9).  The first set of statistics allows us to identify some potential causes of 
the readiness results achieved by MPORAM.  The second set provide a baseline: the 
aggregated initial readiness ratings before distribution of the items in a POM 
programmed purchase plan. 
2. Value Relative to ORAM  
With no significant difference between the results of the single-period solution 
and the multi-period solution, we cannot make any strong conclusions about the added 
value of MPORAM relative to ORAM.  This is particular to the cases provided by G-8 
FDA: the results are strongly influenced by the large difference between the increasing 
demand for equipment (due to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) and the 
projected supply of equipment purchased.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations include the potential uses for MPORAM and the areas for 
further research.   
1. Potential Uses 
MPORAM should be used by G-8 FDA as a tool to evaluate the readiness ratings 
achieved by a CPM solution.  As CPM continues to be used as a key tool to inform POM 
development in G-8, MPORAM can provide the readiness ratings achieved by a CPM 
solution as one metric of the utility of CPM.  MPORAM can also serve as a tool for 
“what-if analysis” for a variety of questions that senior Army leadership may pose about 
a POM equipping strategy.  Two examples of these questions are described in the next 
section.     
There may be situations where MPORAM is necessary to evaluate a POM 
equipping policy.  Even though this does not prove to be the case with the SACS or CPM 
 47 
data used in this thesis, with Army transformation complete and a decrease in the demand 
for deployed forces in future years, coupled with a stronger U.S. economy, the gap 
between demand and supply should decrease.  In that scenario, the results observed in the 
small test case (where the contribution of MPORAM is significant) may be reproduced to 
a realistic case, and we expect MPORAM to determine a distribution plan that differs and 
improves readiness compared to the single-period solution.  We recommend MPORAM 
to continue to be tested by NPS and G-8 FDA. 
2. Areas for Further Research 
Two main areas for further research involve a relaxation of MPORAM used in 
this thesis by allowing every unit to receive every LIN in each period rather than only 
allowing distribution of the LINs programmed for purchase to the units authorized those 
LINs, i.e., allowing elutX  to vary instead of fixing  = 0 for each  and eachelutX e  
( , , )  LUTl u t .  This increases the size of the model and may exceed the ability of a 
typical computer to solve the problem.  It may be possible to tighten the current 
formulation for these relaxations or it may require the development of a heuristic and/or 
decomposition scheme.   
The first area for further research involves allowing MPORAM to delay 
distribution of equipment purchased in one year of the POM to a later year.  This should 
result in more consistent readiness results across the POM and higher overall readiness 
ratings. To achieve this, a “warehouse” entity would need to be created that holds 
equipment not distributed during a given year.  The warehouse input data would need to 
be developed with careful consideration.  This area also requires the model to allow 
equipment transfers from the warehouse in subsequent periods without penalty.  A 
discount on readiness rating weights in later periods is also needed to prevent the model 
prescribing a policy that delays most of the distributions to later periods to achieve higher 
readiness ratings for all high priority units.    
The second area for further research involves allowing MPORAM to determine 
an optimal LIN purchase plan for each year to maximize readiness across the POM.  
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Instead of providing programmed purchase data and a limited budget for additional 
purchases each year, G-8 FDA could input full budget data for each year of the POM and 
allow MPORAM to recommend those purchases.  This solution would provide the upper 
bound on readiness ratings achievable for the allocated budget.  It also gives another 
metric for measuring the quality of a CPM solution or other equipping policy.  This 
would require official budget data from the G-8 Program Analysis and Evaluation 
Directorate. 
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APPENDIX:  SMALL TEST CASE DATA 
This appendix provides the data required by MPORAM (see Section II.D) and 
create the input files described in Table 3 for the small test case discussed in Section 
III.A.1.   
Table 12 provides the initial on-hand, authorized and resulting LIN S-rating for 
both units.  This provides data for the “Oh” and “Req” files, and the first period of the 
“Delta” input file.  Seven of the eight unit-LIN combinations are rated S-4, resulting in 
both units rated S-4.  These initial conditions test MPORAM‟s ability to improve 
readiness over the planning horizon.   
Unit  LIN ERC Authorized On-Hand S-rating 
U01842          A20044 A               460 299 S-3 
U01842          C68719 A               115 74 S-4 
U01842          D02704 P               3 0 S-4 
U01842          M12418       A               144 93 S-4 
U05386          A20044 A               97 63 S-4 
U05386          C68719 A               65 42 S-4 
U05386          D02704 A               2 0 S-4 
U05386          M12418       A               314 204 S-4 
Table 12.   Initial LIN authorizations and on hand data with the resulting LIN S-ratings 
for both units of the small test case.  Seven of the eight LINs are S-4 resulting 
in both units rated S-4. 
The planning horizon (input file “Period”) is composed of periods 1 through 6.  
Table 13 shows the unit data for the entire planning horizon.  This provides data for 
development of the “Unit,” “UnitCycle,” “LIN,” “ARFORGEN,” “ERC,” and  
“Delta” files.  It illustrates how the units‟ priorities change from period to period and how 
their authorizations change during the planning horizon.  Highlighted cells indicate unit-
LIN authorizations that change from the previous period.  Building the “Num” and “Per” 
input files requires applying the unit and LIN S-rating metrics, respectively, of Section 
I.A.4, to the units and unit-LIN authorizations in each period shown in Table 13. 
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UNIT Period  Priority LIN ERC Authorization 
U01842  1 Available A20044          A 460 
U01842          1 Available C68719          A 115 
U01842          1 Available D02704          P 3 
U01842          1 Available M12418          A 144 
U01842 2 Reset A20044          A 460 
U01842 2 Reset C68719          A 115 
U01842 2 Reset D02704          P 3 
U01842 2 Reset M12418          A 144 
U01842 3 T/R A20044          A 460 
U01842 3 T/R C68719          A 115 
U01842 3 T/R D02704          P 3 
U01842 3 T/R M12418          A 144 
U01842 4 Available A20044          A 460 
U01842 4 Available C68719          A 0 
U01842 4 Available D02704          P 6 
U01842 4 Available M12418          A 144 
U01842 5 Reset A20044          A 460 
U01842 5 Reset C68719          A 0 
U01842 5 Reset D02704          P 6 
U01842 5 Reset M12418          A 144 
U01842          6 T/R A20044          A 460 
U01842          6 T/R C68719          A 0 
U01842          6 T/R D02704          P 6 
U01842          6 T/R M12418          A 144 
U05386          1 T/R A20044          A 97 
U05386          1 T/R C68719          A 65 
U05386          1 T/R D02704          A 2 
U05386          1 T/R M12418          A 314 
U05386 2 Available A20044          A 97 
U05386 2 Available C68719          A 65 
U05386 2 Available D02704          A 2 
U05386 2 Available M12418          A 314 
U05386 3 Reset A20044          A 97 
U05386 3 Reset C68719          A 65 
U05386 3 Reset D02704          A 2 
U05386 3 Reset M12418          A 314 
U05386 4 T/R A20044          A 0 
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UNIT Period  Priority LIN ERC Authorization 
U05386 4 T/R C68719          A 65 
U05386 4 T/R D02704          A 0 
U05386 4 T/R M12418          A 314 
U05386 5 Available A20044          A 0 
U05386 5 Available C68719          A 65 
U05386 5 Available D02704          A 0 
U05386 5 Available M12418          A 314 
U05386          6 Reset A20044          A 0 
U05386 6 Reset C68719          A 65 
U05386          6 Reset D02704          A 0 
U05386 6 Reset M12418          A 314 
Table 13.   Unit-LIN authorizations and ARFORGEN cycle data for the small test case.  
Units rotate priorities every period to replicate the ARFORGEN cycle and 
unit authorizations for selected LINs change during the planning horizon to 
replicate changing MTOE authorizations over the POM years. 
Tables 14 and 15 provide the cost for each LIN (constant for all periods) and 
budget by period, respectively.  This provides data for building the “Cost” and “Budget” 
input files.  These data work together to test MPORAM‟s ability to determine a LIN 
purchase plan to improve readiness.     
LIN Cost 
A20044          269 
C68719          125 
D02704          1,997,000 
M12418          256 








Table 15.   Budget by period for the small test case. 
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Table 16 shows the programmed purchase data for each LIN in each period and 
whether each unit has an authorization for that LIN in that period.  If the unit has an 
authorization for the LIN in that period, a one is recorded in the unit column, otherwise a 
zero is recorded.  This provides data for development of the “Avail” and “POM” input 
files.  This tests MPORAM‟s ability to determine a distribution plan for programmed 
purchases. 









A20044          1 20 1 1 
A20044          2 20 1 1 
A20044          3 20 1 1 
A20044          4 20 1 0 
A20044          5 20 1 0 
A20044          6 20 1 0 
D02704 1 2 1 1 
D02704 2 2 1 1 
D02704 3 2 1 1 
M12418        1 60 1 1 
M12418        2 50 1 1 
M12418        3 40 1 1 
M12418        4 30 1 1 
M12418        5 20 1 1 
M12418        6 10 1 1 
Table 16.   Programmed purchase data by period, and whether each unit has an 
authorization for a LIN programmed for purchase in each period (1) or not (0) 
for the small test case. 
Finally, for the “Pt” file, all the penalties for LIN transferring among units have 
been set to 1.0.   
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